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Article 6

Book Reviews

Haliermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity by Seyla Benhabib and Maurizio Passerin d'Entreves. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997. Pp. ix + 305.
$35.00, cloth; $17.00, paper.
The Power of Dialogue: Critical Hermeneutics after Gnda1l1er and Foucault by
Hans Herbert Kogler. Cambridge, MA: MlT Press, 1996. Pp. 322. $35.00.
The reception of Jiirgen Habermas's work presents a certain paradox.
Haberrnas is widely recognized as having developed the Illost ambitious and
fully articulated version of a critical theory of society, one that incorporates
work from anthropology, linguistics, sociology, and psychoanalysis into a
framework sensitive to the linguistic turn in philosophy and postempiricist
currents in tvventieth-century thought. However, his particular formulations
have attracted a good deal of criticism, and his program for a formal pragmatics that would replace ideology-critique, as well as his diagnosis of the
pathologies of modernity as stemming from blocking communication or the
colonization of the Hfe-world, have inspired little research. In contrast with
the broad influence of the best-known postvvar French thinkers, Habermas's
direct influence is mostly limited to the work of close col1eagues and students.
In the culmination of his early work, The Theory of Communicative Actioll,
Habermas locates the normative foundations of a critical theory in the formal
conditions of communication, in particular the purported necessity of the attempt to reach mutual understanding. This conception of communicative action, and the richer conception of reason associated with it, i11uminate and
correct Max Weber's pessimism concerning modernity, which was adopted
by the first generation of critical theorists, such as Max. Horkheimer and
Theodor Adorno, who for Habermas tacitly modeled reason as such solely
on instrumental reason, the human appropriation and transformation of nature. The critical resistance to Habermas's program has centered on dissatisfaction with the claim that appeal to the validity presupposed in each
communicative act can achieve the goals intended by earlier theorists' ideology-critique without reference to concrete social practices, human needs and
desires, configurations of power, actual social groups, and substantive conceptions of happiness and the good. This rejection of the features of "universality, ideality, and transcendence" in Habermas's work helps explain the
resistance of philosophers to his account and the lack of interest in sociology
and culhtral studies in pursuing research in its terms.
FolIowing the publication of The Theory of COl11municative Actiol1, Habennas
broadened his account of modernity from the internal critique of Weber to a
full-fledged defense of modernity as the uncompleted project of enlightenment, a defense given most fully in The Philosophicnl Discourse of Modemity
through a critical examination of Hegel, Nietzsche, Batailie, Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault, and Castoriadis. For Habermas, Hegel in his Jena period
gives the best expression of the project of modenlity: human happiness and
autonomy are to be secured through intersubjective recognition. But Hegel
in his mature thought spoiled this insight by incorporating it into the framework of an absolutist philosophy of Spirit modeled on the productive s('1£externalization and reappropriation of a subject conceived monologically.
Nietzsche abandons Hegel's insight for the project of radical self-overcoming
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through an aestheticist cultivation of self-dissolution in ecstatic experience
and a hermeneutic suspicion toward claims to reason so total as to undermine the self-justification of any form of critique. Heidegger reinterprets the
concept of truth as disclosure and thereby loses the dimension of intersubjective testing, and so he disengages any disclosure from either rational motivation or normative justification.
Habermas finds in each thinker hints of a notion of communicative reason
that are left undeveloped in favor of a philosophy of the subject that valorizes ecstatic self-dissolution in holistic, transsubjective, and uncriticizable
world-disclosures. The initial orientation toward the philosophy of the subject, and the confusion of instrumental reason with reason as such, leads to
increasingly desperate attempts at self-abnegation and orientation to a mysterious, indeed ineffable "other" only partially approximated through a
methodological via negativa. For Habermas, will, Being, the body, nonidentity, power, and difference are the successive divine names of the mystical
theology of counter-modernity.
The essays collected in Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity
characteristically make two responses to Hahermas's account. Most try to
show that Habermas first of all misconstrued the intentions and arguments
of the philosophical modernists. Where Habermas argues that the mature
Hegel abandoned the earlier account of ethical totality, and so the conceptual framework for a nascent articulation of the normative content of modernity, in favor of a conception of spirit modeled on the Fichtean positing
and self-positing subject, Fred Dallmayr counters that spirit is best understood as "a metaphysical or ontolOgical category," not as a super-subject,
and thus is best understood as a "dimension" that is presupposed by both
subjective capacities and objective rational principles, and within which
both are reconciled through experience. Both James Sclunidt and Jay Bernstein respond to Habermas's charge that Foucault was unable to legitimate
historical criticisms due to rus reduction of claims of truth to relations of
power by noting that Foucault's unwillingness to give general grounds for
criticisms follows from rus insistence that there are no such groundsi criticism is always local and particular. In addition, Bernstein claims that Habermas, due to his inadequate understanding of the centrality of aesthetic
concerns in modernity, misses the way in which Foucault, like the other
thinkers Habermas discusses, relies on techniques and procedures of modernist art in presenting criticisms through affective imagery, irony, and negation. Modernist philosophers develop individualized vocabularies,
imagistic discourses, and irreducibly local and context-specific presentations
precisely in order to demonstrate the underdetermination of political judgments .by universalistic rules, and to invoke the suppressed dimensions of
the body, affect, sensuality, and power in modern life.
As Bernstein's essay shows, the attempt to rescue the modernists' discourse
of otherness from Habermas's criticisms requires not just an appeal to the
philosophers' intentions, but also a sketch of an alternative account of philosophical modernity and a diagnosis of Habermas's misprisions from that
perspective. In his introduction, Maurizio Passerin d'Entreves offers such an
account, taking up Stephen K. White's influential distinction between theories
oriented toward explicating responsibility for action and those oriented to-
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ward responsibility for otherness. While the former are guided by the pragmatic imperatives of collective deliberation on and action toward public
issues, the latter attempt to recall and preserve the aspects and features of any
situation that the orientation toward action sets aside. The clearest example of
such a distinction is between political theories that take distributive justice, as
opposed to individualizing care, as their focal concern, and deontological ethical theories of the philosophical modernists, contrasted with those such as
Emmanuel Levinas's or Knud Logstrup's, which focus on the infinite vulnerability of concrete others. Habermas is clearly more concerned with the former
political theories, and the modernists from Nietzsche to the present with the
latter ethical ones.
In generat Habermas sees modernist philosophers as driven to aporia and
performative contradictions-between their implicit claims to truth and seriousness on the one hand, and their explicit rejection of the value of truth, rationality, and reasoned public discussion on the other. His critics, however,
are willing to grant the modernists a kind of thinking more responsive than
Habermas's rationalism to the pervasive anomie and alienation in modern
culture, and more sensitive to the possibility of recognizing subtle patterns
of domination and the mute claims of otherness.
What emerges from this sympathetic collective critique of Habermas's reconstruction of philosophical modernity is a near-total rejection of his claim
to have circumscribed the discourse of otherness by means of a demonstration of the "inevitable" failures and aporias of a totalizing critique of reason.
The force of Habermas's critique depends on a prior acceptance of his program of formal pragmatics as fully explicating the Hegelian account of the
partitioned ethical totality as the starting point of critical theory, along with
an acceptance of the insuperability of distinct value spheres in modernity.
This does not, however, lead to a complete rejection of Habermas's project,
for Habermas has uniquely stressed the importance of the Hegelian account
as a way of explicating the modern demands for freedom, equality, and happiness, and for diagnosing the various inquiries of domination and nonrecognition. From his first book, we may recall, he has linked the unfulfilled
demands of modernity to the tension within institutions between actual procedures and normative claims. Finally, if his accounts of individual modernist philosophers are partial and inadequate, the force of particular criticisms
remains.
A good example of how Habermas's thought can be taken up fruitfully
can be found in Hans Herbert Kogler's The Power of Dialogue. Kogler attempts to show how the actual practices of the human sciences can embody
the intentions of critical theory without recourse either to ideology-critique
or to formal pragmatics. Kogler takes the results of dialogue between members of distinct traditions as the best guide to what critique without unredeemable transcendental guarantees might accomplish. Kogler cites an
intuition of the "critical potential freed up through dialogue" expressed by
Karl Lowith: "Only in conversation does the certain basis of one's own
discourse freely experience uncertainty through the encounter with the
discourse of another, and this experience is not replaceable through any kind
of self-examination or self-critique" (288, n. 14). Cross-cultural dialogue both
facilitates the bringing to light of one's own unexamined prejudgments, and
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ties the emergent understanding to the needs, desires, and canons of intelligibility of the interlocutor. The problem of a transcendental grounding of critique thereby vanishes, and the tendency of critical theory to objectify its
addresses as cultural dopes is finessed.
The adoption of the standpoint of critique through dialogue is an ethical
decision, not the result of theoretical insight, that is motivated by the acceptance of something like Habermas's normative content of modernity. It also
reflects a recognition of the partial incommensurability of non-Western traditions with Western traditions, as well as the loss of the binding power of tradition in modernity and the de facto internal plurality of Western tradition.
For Kogler, the framework of this account is supported by a version of HansGeorg Gadamer's hermeneutics freed from its orientation toward consensus
and its unitarist understanding of tradition, supplemented as well by the
model of local, finite historical critique advanced by Foucault.
It is in Kogler's superb discussion of Gadamer that the productive influence of Habcrmas is best seen. Gadamer attempts to explicate hermeneutic
experience first through his central claim that "Being that is understood is
language," and then through the characterization of language use as transsubjective, in three senses: 1) any particular use of language presupposes a
holistic background disclosure that can never be fully articulated or a fortiori
criticized; 2) dialogic language use is fundamentally "egoless" in that it is
"formally directed toward intersubjectivity" and presupposes a shared
preunderstanding between interlocutors; and 3) dialogic process is modeled
on play, wherein language users are absorbed in their roles and mutually
constitute an event whose meaning is independent of the intentions of any
participant. Combining these claims with the assumption that dialogue is
oriented toward consensus, however, Gadamer is unable to explicate the
sense in which dialogic experience can produce new meaning and new sorts
of understandings, and not necessarily merely deeper awareness of and consensus on prior disclosed meanings.
Kogler follows Habermas's criticisms in The Philosophical Discourse of Modemity of Heidegger's reinterpretation of truth as holistic world-disclosure as
insufficiently acknowledging the possibility of a reflective distancing from
prior meanings through raising the question of their validity. Having introduced the need to account for the fact of understanding incommensurable
mezlI1ings through the examples of cross-cultural understanding; descriptions
such ilS Thomas Kuhn's of massive conceptual change within a tradition; and
,1esthetic modernism's cultivation of novelty through negation, Kogler can
de\'l'lop the melhodology of critical dialogue freed from the aporias of ideolog~'-crilique or tOlalizing critiques of reason. By understanding the possibilit~, of critical self-distancing through the concrete experience of cross-cultural
dialogue, Kogler can systematically develop Habermas's critique \vithout
Innn<11 pragmatics.
'L1kl'n together, these two books develop ways of maintaining the idea of
a (ktr<1n:-;cendcnt,1lized criticZlI theory in accord with Habermas's attempt to
ground the theory in poslconvcntional intersubjective structures. Some of the
prim,1ry .lrC,b of inquiry address the internal difficulties in Habcrmas's act'(1unL l':,pL'ci.111y his inability to explic<1te the genesis of cultllral meZlnings,
,md the unCl'rt,1in sl<1tus of modern <lrt in his theory. The former difficulty
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points to the need for inquiry in areas such as the development of substantive conceptions of happiness, justice and the good, with attention to the
suppression of gender and class. In recent work by Axel Honneth, Nancy
Fraser, and Jessica Benjamin, in this sense, the outlines of a fulfilled life
emerge in chiaroscuro from the investigation of social and psychological injuries. The latter difficulty is addressed by Jay Bernstein's Adornoesque insight into the way modern art has become the placeholder for otherwise
forgotten dimensions of freedom and demands for happiness. Such a theory
need not adopt Habermas's formalism or orientation towards rationality, but
it could usefully be guided by his ongoing critique of existing practices and
institutions from the standpoint of the modern promise of an undamaged
life.
University of California, Berkeley

John Rapko

Unediting the Renaissance: Shakespeare, Marlowe, Milton by Leah S. Marcus.
London and New York: Routledge, 1996. Pp. xii + 268. 22 illustrations. $69.95
(£ 40.00) hardcover; $18.95, paper.

This is a welcome book. For several years Leah Marcus has been arguing
-in print, at conferences, and in the classroom-that, following Randall
McLeod's lead, we "unedit" early modern texts. Here she has put together
revisions of earlier essays and added new material. The result is a convincing argument for leaving Renaissance texts just the way they are, thank you
very much. It is as well an indictment, I think, against post-Enlightenment
"scientific" thought and the (largely negative) effect it has had on textual
analysis and literary studies.
A word of warning. Read the book through. Don't race to the Shakespeare
or Marlowe chapters, as this might well lead to the conclusion that Marcus's
book is a gathering of Text A versus Text B essays. It is not. The book progresses and concludes, and its conclusion turns back upon its beginning and
demands a reconsideration and reevaluation of all that she has said earlier.
Marcus opens with an essay on the methods, or pseudo-methods, of postRenaissance editorsi she discusses the "blew ey'd hag," Caliban's mother Sycroax in The Tempest (Act I, scene 2, TLN 396), and what editors and
annotators over the years have done with and to those blue eyes. Are they
dark (and thus evil) circles around the eyes, or might the eyes, flying in the
face of Petrarchan norms for the ideal woman, actually be blue? If the latter
obtains, then what are we to make, positive, of those blue eyes? Marcus
cares less about answering the questions she has posed than about inquiring
into the methodology of the answers of earlier editors from the eighteenth
century onwards, editors increasingly situated in their own particular historical moments and burdened with their own epistemologies. With the New
Historicism rescuing and redeeming Caliban, can Shakespeare actually have
meant what he said?
In her second chapter Marcus takes up "Textual Stability and Ideological
Difference," using Christopher Marlowe's Doctor Faustus as a case in point.
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The text or texts of this play present a number of problems. The "A-Text" of
1604 gives us one play, the "B-Text" of 1616 quite another one. Most editors,
looking out there for the "ideal" (fat chance) text that Marlowe actually
wrote, looking for the author's final version/revision/reversion, looking for
that Platonic model, combine those two texts to give readers a text a closest
to the author." This involves conflating the two texts, preferring certain lines,
passages, and scenes in one text over those in the other. But, as Marcus
argues, "Dr. Faustus was malleable and unfixed from the outset, acted in different 'local' versions which can be correlated with different historical moments" (41). Marcus takes her key from differing place names in the two
texts. In the 1604 text Faustus hails from Wertenberg, while in the 1616 text
he is from Wittenburg. We are so familiar with Wittenburg, "a prominent
university town, a haven for lingering elements of late-medieval scholasticism but also the intellectual center of Lutheranism" (44) that we assign
Wertenburg, "well known to English Protestants through its associations
with the uprisings by radical Zwinglian Protestants during the sixteenth century" (45) to nowhere. Thus the" A-Text" associates Faustus with a "German
duchy that was a hotbed of left-wing Protestantism," while the B-text's Wittenberg was "the center of a more conservative Lutheran orthodoxy" (45).
Marcus gives us two different plays, two discrete versions, each with its own
integrity, its own "authority," and its own theology.
But there is, as Marcus points Qut, a third text among the many editions of
Dr. Faustus, a quarto of 1663, whose "text shows a consistent pattern of alteration designed to retool the play for a new theatrical and reading audience"
(62). Here the scene with the Pope (B-text only) has been replaced by a visit
to the court of Salomaine in Babylon. Different political and theological times
call for different plays, for variant texts. There is no one Dr. Faustus. There
are, at least, three.
Shakespeare suffers more from the need for one pure, "right," "correct"
text than Marlowe if only because his dramatic output was greater, occasioning a greater number of different texts of the "same" play and because "we
as a culture demand far greater perfection of Shakespeare than we do of
Marlowe" (69). Marcus argues in "Purity and Danger in the Modern Edition" that the first (and "bad") quarto of The Merry Wives of Windsor "needs
to be considered as distinct from the folio rather than a mere corruption of it,
and vastly different in terms of its dramatic patterning in ideological function" (70). In brief, Marcus argues convincingly that the quarto, though a
mess, appears to be court-hostile, while the folio, more tidy and "correct,"
appears court-friendly. We have two different plays for, presumably, two
different audiences, and yet the "editorial tradition" insists that there must
be one text, "the" text.
In "The Editor as Tamer" Marcus discusses two shrewish texts, the anonymous 1594 Taming of a Shrew and the Folio Taming of the Shrew. These are
two very different texts, the first with lines that sound a lot like Shakespeare
(and Marlowe), the second (but this may be only because it is in the Folio),
entirely Shakespearean. Marcus uses feminist and gender criticism to show
how A Shrew has been surpressed in favor of The Shrew because Katherine's
taming in the former is far more questionable than it is in the latter. Ferando
is far less clever than Petruchio. The speech (homily) Katherine (not Kate, for
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that is what others, males, call her: "They call me Katherine that do talk of
me") gives at the end of a A Shrew is religious, not, as in The Shrew, political.
Marcus suggests "that we start thinking of the different versions of The Taming of the Shrew intertextually ... to carry Shakespearean studies out of the
filiative search for a single 'authentic' point of origin and into a discursive
world in which the authority of the author loses it elan and the work is recognized as instable, existing as an array of concrete, physical documents
rather than as that elusive disembodied entity, the work as the author intended it" (124).
In her discussion of Hamlet, "Bad Taste and Bad Hamlet," Marcus leaves
Folio Hamlet aside, perhaps at her peril, and concentrates on the "bad" first
quarto of 1603 and the good/better Hamlet of 1604/1605. Here, focusing on
the "To be or not to be" soliloquy, she "recasts the discussion about QI Hamlet entirely by considering that text and its 'betters' in terms of the differing
expectations created by orality and writing as competing forms of communication with the Renaissance playhouse" (137). Throughout Ql Hamlet, from
its opening to the "To be or not to be" soliloquy to Hamlet's last words, she
finds theological and emotional consistency, quite in tune with Renaissance
Christian thought but quite out of tune with twentieth-century doubt and
uncertainty. So too in the theater, where "Q2 frequently doubles back upon
itself and slows down the action with long meditative speeches, QI Hamlet
has no time for prolonged meditation and very little time for soliloquies"
(145). As willing to invent fictions about texts as the next scholar, Marcus offers three narratives about Hamlet. The first features Shakespeare, a young
playwright in London, trying his hand at a play. The second, using the first,
features the same playwright becoming dissatisfied with his first Hamlet and
revising it. Finally, Shakespeare, having "written the true and perfect Copy
later published as Q2, cuts down Hamlet for performance" (150). Her chapter
tells us things we don't want to hear, not only about the play(s) but also
about ourselves and our needs.
uJohn Milton's Voice/' Marcus' final chapter, is about Milton, to be sure,
but she sweeps in her old friend Herrick along with Donne and Herbert and
nondramatic Shakespeare. She takes on those blue-bound Clarendon editions
of seventeenth-century poets and shows how, in their presentations, they
deprive readers of a wealth of information, visual and verbal and visual/
verbal, available to seventeenth-century readers. Marcus spends a good deal
of time on the 1645 volume of Milton's poems, where Milton (and Humphrey Moseley, his publisher) place "On the morning of Christ's Nativity"
first, although there are earlier English poems, seeking to parallel the poet's
"birth" in print with another, perhaps even more momentous nativity. Oh
dear.
Marcus proposes "unediting" the Renaissance "not as a permanent condition or even as a possible condition, but rather as a process by which we recover and reconsider sixteenth- and seventeenth-century printed materials in
the uncouth, maladept, confusing, maddeningly or delightfully unstable,
compelling bodies in which they circulated through their culture and
reached readers who were part of the same culture" (227). Though preaching
to a convert, Leah Marcus has reminded me of the many ways one can go after texts, the variety of approaches we have at our disposal to evaluate texts,

140

Criticism, Vol. XL, no. 1: Book Reviews

and the sheer fun of teasing out and substantiating readings in texts once
deemed not worth the good paper on which they were printed.
A final word. I like footnotes a lot. There are none here. But the end notes
are terrific, even if the nipping forward and back becomes arduous at times.
Marcus's documentation is full, discursive, and scrupulous.

St. Lawrence University

Thomas L. Berger

Things of Darkness: Economies of Race and Gender in Early Modern England by
Kim F. Hall. Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1995. Pp. xiii
+ 319. $42.50, cloth; $17.95, paper.

Kim Hall begins Things of Darkness with the claim that critics and readers
have refused to acknowledge that the black/white or dark/light binarism so
prevalent in early modern English literature is racialized. Hall aims to complement Winthrop Jordan'S survey of the negative meanings of blackness in
contrast to whiteness and light which opens rus White over Black: American
Attitudes toward the Negro, and wishes to extend his argument by demonstrating how" gender concerns are crucially embedded in discourses of race"
(2). Unlike earlier work which surveyed Africans in Renaissance drama
(Eldred Jones, 1965; Elliot H. Tokson, 1982), Hall is interested in what I have
elsewhere termed "rhetorical miscegnation" in "linked oppositionsr especially of black and wrute" so widespread in Petrarchan lyric, Renaissance
drama and romance (Shakespeare Reproducedr ed. Howard and OrConnorr
1987: 144). Hall's is the first book-length study of blackness, colonialism and
the construction of race in early modern England and follows in the footsteps of work done in the eighties, mostly on Shakespeare's Othello (Karen
Newman, 1987; Martin Orkin, 1987; Ania Loomba, 1989). Though Hall considers some materials that have been mined beforer including George Sesf s
account of the origins of blackness in Hakluyfs Principal Navigations r the
proverb "to wash the Ethiop white," John Pory's English translation of Leo
Africanus's A Geographical Historic of Africa, Purchas, Raleigh, Jonson's
Masqlle of Blackness and Shakespeare's Tempest, she also considers a variety of
less well-known texts such as Abraham Hartwell's A Reporte of the Kingdome
of COllgo (1597), Richard Eden's translation of Lopez de Gomora, The Decades
of the Newe Worlde (1555), some lesser known poems of blackness that are
usefully reprinted in an appendixr several versions of the Cleopatra storyr
writings by early modern women writers including Wrothr and most interestingly, material culturer particularly jewelry and portraiture.
The book is divided into five chaptersr on travel narratives and early histories of Africa, on lyric, particularly the darkl fair dichotomies of the Elizabethan sonnet ·vvith emphasis on Sidney'S Astrophel and Stella, on drama,
particularly Jonson's Masque of Blackness and Shakespeare's Anto11Y and Cleopatra and The Tcmpcst, on early modern English women writers and race, and
a final chapter, the promise of fascinating work to come, on material culture
and representations of blackness in cameos, miniatures and portraits that include a black servant. In her readings of English lyric, drama and material
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culture, she argues convincingly that gender is a "primary site for the production of blackness" and that "female bodies serve as the testing ground for
the symbolic boundaries of culture and race" (101). A short epilogue seeks to
place Hall's project in relation to debates in black feminist criticism about
methodology, canonicity and essentialism. Hall argues persuasively that
"black feminist criticism is a methodology rather than a performance of
blackness" (263), and refuses to make herself "the native informant on race
in the Renaissance," but nevertheless tends to exclude all but the work of
women of color in tracing her own critical genealogy-Morrison, Spivak, and
Loomba. In short, though Hall disavows essentialism, she occasionally enacts
it at the level of citation and scholarly apparatus.
This contradiction characterizes not only her methodological discussion,
but the larger argument of the book which, while claiming to historicize race
in early modern England continually slips into ahistorical claims about
blackness and its negative valence. Hall argues for what she terms a strategic
anachronism (261), but the contradiction remains. If the racialized dark/light
dichotomy Hall analyzes is produced as a result of colonialism and the development of the slave trade, then it cannot mean the same way in Petrarch,
for example; and what is to be made of the racialized discourse toward the
Irish that precedes colonial expansion? Such problems are never addressed.
Equally troubling is Hall's tendency to read the texts she considers in binary
fashion. Blackness is always read negatively, the opposite of beauty and the
sign of subjugation, with the result that racism with regard to blackness
comes to seem ahistorical, always already there. In exposing racism, we
must beware of, in Derrida's words ("Racism's Last Words"), passing "segregation off as natural-and as the very law of the origin" by insisting on a
historical specificity that while recognizing a shared vocabulary also distinguishes the dark/light dichotomy in Petrarch from that in Sidney, or by allowing that the figure of the black cameo or the submissive black servant
boy in portraiture may elude the supremacist aims of its owner! wearer
(Critical Inquiry 12 [1985]). Toni Morrison ends her powerful account of
whiteness and the literary imagination (Playing in the Dark [1992]) which Hall
acknowledges as a central text for her political and critical project thus:
All of us, readers and writers, are bereft when criticism remains too
polite or too fearful to notice a disrupting darkness before its eyes. (91)
Hall admirably refuses to ignore that darkness, to see it as merely metaphorical, but in her concern to demonstrate the oppressive force of the black!
white opposition, she may occlude its disrupting power. The reservations
expressed here-about essentialism, historical specificity, and a binary reading of the meaning of the dark/light, black/white opposition-are not, of
course, peculiar to Hall's project but trouble the burgeoning scholarship on
race and colonialism in literary studies more generally. Things of Darkness
brings to its reader a host of new materials that make it required reading for
any teacher of early modern English culture and for scholars interested in
the historical construction of racial categories and discourse.

Brown University

Karen Newman
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The Matter of Revolution: Science, Poetry, and Politics in the Age of Milton
by John Rogers. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996. Pp. xvi
+ 257. $39.95.

John Rogers's book writes a crucial chapter-section in the literary history
of a notoriously complex and tricky ideologeme: materialism. The specificseventeenth-century-materialism in question is called variously religious or
animist materialisIDr hylozoistic pantheism, or-the term favored by Rogers,
which I'll now adopt-vitalism: in all variants it involves the belief that soul
and body, spirit and matter, are indiviSibly one, that spirit is always embodied (thus, in this period, and never or very rarely that it makes no sense to
use the distinct terms "soul", "body", "spirit", "matter"). The main aims of
the book are three: 1) to demonstrate that vitalist discourses and ideas were
prevalent in the middle part of the seventeenth century (c. 1625-75), and that
they achieved fullest expression, scope, and currency in what he calls the Vitalist Moment, which coincided precisely with the years of the English revolution (1649-52); 2) to show that the vitalist idea was, in tendency and fact,
politically charged-more specifically that it was a liberal or protoliberal
idea; and 3) to analyze the processing of the idea in specific cultural and literary texts, tracing in detail the various consequences of its meetings and
mutual embodiments with other current ideologies and received genres.
Since these aims are accomplished, one may say that they are also the
book's great virtues. Rogers certainly shows that there was a great deal of vitalism being thought and written, to diverse ends, in the middle years of the
century, and particularly from 1649 to 1652. Not just translations of the
chemist-philosophers Jean Baptiste van Helmont and Francis Glisson and a
spate of native alchemical texts, all vitalist, but a new, animist theory of the
revolution of the blood and of generation in more mainstream scientific texts
by William Harvey; not only the remarkable blossoming of an animist-communist social critique in the Digger spokesperson Winstanley, but the vitalist-based republicanism of the new state's spokesman, Milton (whose
conversion to a monistic theory of the soul Rogers plausibly traces to this
moment); not just the ontology of Cavendish's royalist science but also that
of Marvell's exquisite, ambivalently parliamentary lyrics: no one, I think, has
brought the various vitalist discourses together in this way, or demonstrated
so convincingly that vitalist notions of matter proliferated especially just at
mid-century. No one has identified the monistic substance as matter of revolution.
To show that there was a vitalistic boom in the years of the Commonwealth is not to prove that vitalist ontology was intrinsically revolutionary,
of course, or indeed forward-looking. Rogers is far from taking its political
affinities and meanings for granted; his case on this score is impressively
careful and sophisticated. It is to some extent simply empirical. Most vitalists, Rogers says, sided with Parliament through the civil war, and many
were left of Independency; it was not a mistake that after the Restoration, vitalism was marked in the collective memory as a product of Zeal.
But why should it have worked this way, and been coded thus? Rogers
does argue for a positive affinity between vitalist ontology and certain positive (protoliberal and radical) outlooks, or in other words between the key
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vitalist ideas themselves and certain sociopolitical groupings. Two aspects of
the vitalist position account for this affinity. First, the collapSing of soul into
body tended to break or damp down the familiar invidious oppositions, basic to traditional self-representation, that went along with this distinctionoppositions betvveen higher and lower, more active and more passive states,
and so on. Thinking the individual soul in or as or "together with" the body
tended to refigure human moral agency as a process of inunanent self-modelling. It put both God and Sin at once at a distance, yet brought them inside. Thus, as opposed to the various Calvinisms and mechanistic theoriesand it's these that Rogers sees mid-century vitalism as intervening againstthe notion of the material soul empowered the human creature, making it
seem possible and indeed simply natural for people to "rule themselves," in
ways and arenas not excluding political ones.
Second, the equating of spirit with matter tended, it seems, to have had a
certain homogenizing effect on the individuals conceived as fashioned from
the new spiritous substance, and so coincided with a renewal, or better a
threatening literalization of, that perennial, and peremually rhetorical, Christian egalitarianism according to which the poor peasant woman's soul is
worth just as much to Jesus as the king's. Vitalism levelled individual subjects, that is, as well as empowering them. Accordingly-so Rogers assumes
and argues-it was attractive to those groups and individuals who felt themselves to represent, and wanted, a freer, more equal species of individuality
(which is to say a more free and equal polity and society).
It says something interesting about the revolutionary period, perhaps, and
about our own moment as well, that Rogers is at pains not to cast vitalism as
(part of) an "organic" ideology: that is, as a distinctive and definite set upon
the world provided by members of some new or newly aspiring class, corresponding to, and elaborated on the basis of, the novelty of its life conditions
and interests. Rogers is making a different, more tentative and limited-in a
word a more strictly discursive-sort of argument than Tawney made for
English Puritanism as a capitalist ideology, or, to take a somewhat more pertinent example (since he is treating of the origins of liberalism), than C. B.
Macpherson made for Hobbesian socia-physics and contractualism as assuming the peculiar conceptuality or categorization-of-activity of a market society and bourgeoiS life-world. Rogers suggests (p. 22) that the more
physiological versions of vitalism might have been spurred or propped up
by the (real and discursive) emergence of a free market, but this remains a
very minor motive; we are not allowed to forget for long that the originators
of vitalism were chemists, and the main "theorists" among them (van Helmont, Glisson) foreign, their works Englished during this moment. The chief,
the really moving event behind vitalist ideas' appeal was political, was the
revolution itself, though political happenings could have such a strong and
immediate ontological effect owing to a general discursive condition which
itself tends to take on the status of an underlying cause in Rogers's argument. Vitalist philosophy came to seem plausible and urgently exciting because the political discourses justifying revolution needed bolstering from
other discursive spheres. But even had there been a strong republican tradition in Britain (Rogers more or less assumes, I believe, that there was not),
the continuing habit and prestige of analogy in this premodern period would
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have made such bolstering, consisting of the discovery of "republican-liberal" models of (relatively autonomous) agency and (relatively egalitarian) organization in other fields, imperative. Vitalism, we might say then, was an
organic ideology in the sense of limning in the necessary assumptions, not of
a class, but of a historical moment, that in which the revolution happens
and, the country finding itself (becoming) republican, attempts to resituate
itself appropriately within the analogical matrix so that all coherence not be
gone. Thus it is that Rogers can account, in what for me is one of the
triumphs of his argument, for the tenacious and manifestly anxious subscription, against their best aristocratic instincts, of the royalist scientists Harvey
and Cavendish to vitalist ontologies.
Yet this pragmatic, "discursivist" explanation, it seems to me, leads also to
some less satisfactory analyses and emphases. I am thinking especially of the
last chapter, in which Rogers asks why, not vitalist, but Hobbesian mechanistic materialism came to serve as the ontological basis for British liberalism.
He frames the question in such a way as to suggest a conventionalist version
of Macpherson's argument. VVhether or no Hobbes's basic tenets reflected
deep-bourgeois assumptions "from the first," it carne over time to seem that
way, to be in fact the case, as the tradition of political liberalism established
and consolidated itself. Things might have been otherwise, it's implied; vitalism might have won out and come to underpin liberal political principles,
thereby becoming organic itself and yielding a kinder, better liberalism. This
alternate scenario didn't-couldn't-materializer Rogers suggests, because
vitalism had a fatal flaw which rendered it incapable of being coherently
figured, an internal failing plainly witnessed by its literary expressions even
in its moment. This flaw consisted in its being really egaHtarian in its implications-impossibly egalitarian, or at least too much and too vaguely so,
Rogers implies.
My reservations concerning this argument don't have so much to do with
the readings which Rogers offers to sustain, though there does appear what
may be a telltale drift in the direction of allegorical interpretation (wherein,
for exampler in what seems to me the one really implausible reading in the
whole book, the faun of Marvell's "Nymph Complaining" becomes a figure
for vitalism, and the poem an elegy for the vitalist moment itself). My misgivings have rather to do with the type and degree of agency attributed to
ideas here, which seems somewhat inconsistent when it is not somewhat exorbitant. Rogers's rhetoric suggests that there was something somehow lacking in the various vitaHst discourses themselves, some elusive promise of
coherence that they failed to realize; yet he straightforwardly acknowledges,
at the end of this chapter, that they were simply too radical to articulate the
hegemonic values of the men of property who to some extent made, to some
extent captured, the revolution. If vitalism was too egalitarian to serve as a
coherent sub tending liberal ideology in its moment and wasn't brought back
later to serve this functionr perhaps that was because it wasn't compatible
with liberalism-wasn't a protoliberal ideology at all, or at least (and Rogers
sometimes suggests as much) not in the main. VVhy should this be seen as a
tragedy?
Whatever the ultimate explanatory value of the book's discursivism, it
does not prevent a meticulous and subtle attention to matters of literary
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form. Rogers avoids the problems generally associated with the literary history of ideas and discourses, as it seems to me, by focussing on the relation
between (religious or natural-philosophical) discourse and literary figuration
or form, and assuming the symptomatic or overdetermined character of this
relation. Though Rogers's chapters are remarkably coherent with one another
in approach and tenor, they are too dense and varied to permit more than
the barest of summaries here. They move chronologically, so that one comes
away with some sense, appropriately tricky, of vitalist ontology's historical
winning through and losing out. This sense will not come through in the following summary; nor that the specific readings and arguments are unfailingly provocative; nor that they are usually convincing. In chapter one,
Rogers considers the implications of the incursion of a vitalistic explanation
for the circulation of the blood into Harvey's reissue of his famous theory in
1649 (in a text titled Of the Circulation of the Blood; the theory had first been
published, in Of the Motion of the Heart, in 1628). Chapters two and three provide an unexpected and original view of Marvell as a lyricist of vitalism, arrived at by way of a comparison with Winstanley. Four and five show how
Milton's monistic materialism informs and distorts the narrative representation of Creation and Fall, respectively, in Paradise Lost. Chapter Six returns to
natural philosophy, and argues that Margaret Cavendish, in her scientific
writings, turns the doctrine of spiritualized matter into an antipatriarchal
principle, using it as the chief support for a feminist politics.
As an authoritative treatment of the cultural significance of religious materialism in the middle part of the seventeenth century, this intelligent and
useful study assumes a place alongside two very different books, Christopher Hill's The World Turned Upside Down (1972) and Stephen Fallon's Milton
among the Philosophers (1991). It deserves to be widely read.
Loyola University-Chicago

Christopher Kendrick

Gray Agonistes: Thomas Gray mid Masculine Friendship by Robert F. Gleckner.
Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. Pp. x

+ 231. $45.00.
With Gray Agonistes: Thomas Gray and Masculine Friendship, Robert F.
Gleckner takes up anew the issues of poetic influence and agon that have occupied the better part of his career. His last monograph, Blake and Spenser
(1985), his "Joyce's Blake: Paths of Influence" (William Blake and the Modems,
1982), his earlier article in the pages of this journal, "Blake, Gray, and the illustrations" (1977), and his still justly respected The Piper and the Bard: A
Study of William Blake (1957), indicate the abiding strength of Gleckner's interest in what he has long called "Significant a11usion." In this his most recent book Gleckner defines the "notion" as allusion "reasonably verifiable by
the total thrust of the poem into which it has been imported as evoking its
original context, not merely its dictional felicitousness or even its linguistic
appropriateness to that poem's general tenor or subject" (154). In Blake and
Spenser, Gleckner's introductory discussion of Blake's illustrations to Gray's
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Poems presented Blake as the model artist whose agonistic relation to Spenser provided that kind of fertile "melange" of "significant allusions" to
which Gleckner has persistently addressed his energy and learning. Gray, at
the time, was of less interest: "From the pattern of his allusions to Spenser as
well as to other poets, contemporary and early, it is clear that Gray's purpose in such allusions ... was to incorporate in his own poetry Ie mot juste,
what was ne'er so well expressed ..." (Blake and Spenser 13). Now, however,
Gray's "brilliant poetic and allusional strategies" (8) and "allusive depths"
(185) reveal to Gleckner's keen eye a subtextual double narrative of agon
and anxiety in Gray's "relationships" with Milton and Richard West. Gray
Agonistes thus represents both a logical step in Gleckner's career and the welcome fruition of that exciting strain of historicist Gray criticism advanced by
Raymond Bentman, George Haggerty, Jean Hagstrum, Wallace Jackson, Suvir Kaul, and, to a certain extent, G. S. Rousseau.
This is a book with a story to tell, and Gleckner is candid about the nature
of his endeavor: "I am not unwilling that what follows be received as something like a psychobiography" (16). His italics are apt, since Gray Agonistes is
in fact a satisfying piece of criticism that combines impressive scholarship
with tightly focused-sometimes overly so-dose readings. But its aim is
less to leave readers with new interpretations of individual poems than to
offer a new understanding of the poet and his career: "my intention [is] to illuminate not so much Gray's life as Gray's life in his poetry, not so much
Gray as man but Gray as poet seeing himself as a man, not so much Gray's
psyche as his imaginative reflections and representations of that psyche in
the poetry, of which it is fundamentally constitutive" (16). Despite these
early distinctions, Gray Agonistes often does attempt to see into the emotional
life of "Gray as man," and the title, taken from Hagstrum's "Gray's Sensibility"-"The true man was Gray Agonistes"-suggests the critical character of
the-project. Gleckner consequently "eschew[s] an elaborate skein of theoretical underpinnings from Freud or Foucault or Lacan or lrigaray or Kristevaor from other related, oft-quoted authorities" (16), and the result is a sometimes frustrating, sometimes refreshing, biographical rhetoric that produces a
rich analysis of Gray's career in light of what Gleckner's supple intellect has
come to understand of Gray's agonistic poetic and epistolary writings, his
conflicted narratives of personal and poetic hopes and fears.
The story that emerges from Gray's poems and letters is thus "a double
narrative of interlocking 'personal histories': (1) his heroic engagement with
the reigning power of Milton's achievement and with his precedential model
for a literary career, both fueling Gray's drive toward the status of Poet in
his own right, not of mere Miltonic imitator; and (2) his equally heroic struggle to come to terms with his own sexuality, with his love for West, with his
all-absorbing grief at West's early death, and finally with his late-life love of,
and abandonment by, Bonstetten" (7). FollOWing the introduction, the book
accordingly sets out "The Miltonic Background," as Chapter 2 is called, followed by two chapters on Gray's relationship with West, their correspondence, and the meaning of the Quadruple Alliance during and after the edenic
Eton days: "Gray, West, and Epistolary Encoding" and "Gray, West, Walpole, and the Letters." Having set up this dual structure, Gleckner then in
four consecutive chapters ("The Poems" I, II, ill, and IV) takes the reader
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through Gray's career as it is constituted by the \vays in \vhich Gray's t·wo
personal narratives "interlock, intersect, interanimate with, even at times
serve as surrogates (or metonymies) for, each other" (8).
Gleckner's challenge in reading Gray's career through these two narratives
is to bring them together convincingly, and in this he succeeds admirably. I
will offer the barest of sketches to illustrate the kind af synthesis he is able to
craft through the explication of Gray's allusions. According to Gleckner,
Gray was almost unique in the mid-eighteenth century for his recognition of
the "satanic" nature of Milton's intention in Paradise Lost "with no middle
flight. . to soar / Above th' Aonian mount" in pursuit of "Things unattempted yet in prose or rhyme." "Up led by thee," Miltan invokes his heavenly muse Urania at the beginning of Book 7, "Into the heav'n of heav'ns I
have presumed ... " (12-13). At the end of The Progress of Poesy, a poem in
which Gleckner demonstrates the parallels between Gray's portrait of Milton
and Milton's portrait of God in Book 3, Dryden's "less presumptuous" verse,
while celebrated, is all but dismissed as a vehicle worthy to succeed Milton's
achievement. Gray himself, the "daring spirit" of the final stanza, will ostensibly follow Milton's ambitious ascent: "Yet shall he mount, and keep his
distant way / Beyond the limits af a vulgar fate" (121-22). But the poem
"waffles uncertainly" (36) betvveen MHtonic daring and the lesser presumption of Dryden, settling finally if temporarily on Gray's vague and middling
"distant way," a way that would collapse in Gray's final encounter with Milton's ghost at the end of The Bard. The Miltonic sublime for Gray, then, is
more than a matter of a style to be imitated; it is a presumptuous transgression for which, in The Progress of Poesy, Milton is anxiously rejected and recompensed with blindness: "He saw; but blasted with excess of light, /
Closed his eyes in endless night" (101-2), and it is this last phrase Gray uses
to describe Milton, a phrase in fact written by West, that will serve to illustrate Gleckner's method.
If Gray's ambition to fo11O\v Milton is both dangerous and transgressive"as God and heaven were to Milton, so Milton and poetic immortality were
ta Gray" (28)-equally so is the subtextual subject of Gray's attempts to sing
with Milton's voice, his homosexual love for \!\Iest and his extended mourning over \Vest's death. 1n \Vest's Ad Amicos, which West sent to Gray in a letter dated July 4, 1737-"unquestionably a turning point in Gray's life" (68)\'\'est prophesies his own approaching end. Concluding, West solaces himself
with the elegiac reflection that his parting soul could yet cast one "longing
ling'ring look behind" to "some fond breast," Gray's: "Yet sOl11e there are
(ere spent my vital days) / \Vithin whose breasts my tomb r wish to r<lise"
(Corrc;;l'ol/{icllct' of Tholl1as Gray 64). The parenthetic remark, however, was
not \Vcst's but Gray's; \Vest's original phrase, "ere sunk in endless night,"
Gr.1Y replaced with "ere spent my \·ital days" (<lltering the next line as well)
long <lfter he transcribed the origin<ll poem into his commonplace book, saving \Vest's words for l'vlilton's blindness in Thc Progrc55 of POC5Y and for his
own ending in Tile Rard years later: "Deep in the roaring tide he sunk [;11(ered later to "plung'd"J to endless night." According to Cleckner's narrati\'c, this allusive "finishing" (the title of Gleckner's Conclusion) t(l 1'111' Hard
\\'.1S <lisp the figurative finishing to Grav's i\liltnnic C<lrcer, ,1n ,1dmi..;"ioll of
(,lilufC th.lt led to no pilstufes ncw bu·' rather to his "abortivt' fnfay inln
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Welsh and Norse antiquarianism" (158). As Milton's transgression blasted
his sight, closing his eyes "in endless night," Gray's curtailed relationship
with West sunk Gray into an endless night of mourning, announced in The
Bard by the poet's final fatal plunge. Gray's poems, then, only refigure
West's prophetic wish and Milton's satanic trespass, making of Gray the
tomb in which lie both his transgressive but failed ambitions, to be a Miltonic-inspired poet (Gray settles for a series of "middle flights") and to love
West (Gray can only "fruitless mourn to him, that cannot hear"). Gleckner's
Gray, then, can only be excavated by attending to the subtextual narratives
Gray simultaneously revealed and obscured through careful encoding and
demandingly significant allusions.
At times, the Gray of the Miltonic sublime as the true Gray-the most
meaningful and interesting-is hard to accept, and when we are told that
what is remarkable about the Favourite Cat ode is "Gray's extraordinary success in deflecting our attention from his personal poetic agon" (157), his success seems extraordinary indeed. Gleckner's analysis of the ElegIj (126-33), in
particular, is so "sharply focused" (132) as to exclude any mention of the
"rude forefathers of the hamlet" who are in fact "each in his narrow cell for
ever laid." Gleckner replaces them with West, too firmly accommodating the
poem to his thesis: Gray's line 21, "For them no more the blazing hearth
shall burn," becomes Gray Agonistes' "For [him1no more the blazing hearth
shall burn" (129).
But Cleckner's narrative of Gray's career remains for the most part persuasive. Because of its intricacy and erudition, Gray Agonistes will be of interest
primarily to Gray scholars and Miltonists, but its candid and rigorous examination of Gray's sexual anxieties and milieu will prove engaging to all students of the eighteenth century, of the history of sexuality, and of the poetics
of (auto)biographical writing.
University of Pennsylvania

Daniel E. White

Fantastic Modernity: Dialectical Readings in Romanticism and Theory by Orrin
N. C. Wang. Baltimore: The Jolms Hopkins University Press, 1996. Pp. x
+ 232. $38.50.
Romanticist criticism has been in a reflexive mode lately: some of its
strongest and most prominent scholars have been devoting a good deal of
their energies to writing metacritical essays about the state of the field. How
to explain Romantic studies' recent preoccupation with itself? And how
might we in turn reflect on this moment, sorting out the unproductively selfconscious critical stutter from forms of meta commentary that genuinely help
us understand where we are? In Fantastic Modernity, Orrin Wang admirably
addresses these and other questions. He argues that twentieth-century Romantic studies-and especially those of the last twenty years-have always
constituted even if only implicitly a highly self-reflexive discourse; one of
the central goals of his book is to explore why and how the field of Romanticism especially bears tl1is burden. Thus this is a book which should be ex-
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tremely interesting not only to all scholars of the Romantic period, but also
to all persons interested in the history and politics of recent literary theory
and criticism.
Wang situates Romanticist criticism's reflexivity within its dialogue with
postmodernism, investigating the ways in which contemporary critics reconfigure Romantic texts n as the primal scene for their own postmodem theory"
(6). (It should be pointed out that Wang sometimes uses "postmodernism"
somewhat restrictively to indicate the world of poststructuralist literary
theory, and sometimes to indicate a more broadly theorized social or cultural
postrnodern "condition".) He proposes that the relationship between Romanticism and postmodernism may become intelligible if we focus on both discourses' orientation towards the notion of modernity, a notion which, he
argues, has for both a central and ineluctably fantastic quality. The concept
of modernity holds out the possibilities of both historical identity and historical difference, possibilities that are always shifting and heterogenous. So, for
example, while we have traditionally understood Romanticism as a movement completely bound up with a sense of its own newness and of its role in
forging radical cultural change, we have also come to understand it as
deeply skeptical of such claims. Postrnodemism's relation to the modern is
of course always vexed, as it projects modernity as that from which it radically breaks, a modernity it defines variously and differentially in relation to
Enlightenment or Romanticism. In some versions, moreover, the postmodern
condition represents an epistemological and ontological rupture with the
very kind of historical thinking that grounds the notion of the modern. By
demonstrating modernity's unstable, fantastic, ever-vanishing nature within
and between Romanticism and postmodernism, Wang pinpoints the lTIoden1
as that which is both disruptive to and yet constitutive of historical understanding.
What emerges from Fantastic Modernity is not a totalizing view of either
postmodernism or Romanticism, but rather the particularities of a number of
specific and often contradictory engagements, worked out through a series of
chapters that pair Romantic writers with contemporary thinkers. Wang reads
de Man with Shelley, Bloom with Emerson, feminist Romanticists with Wollstonecraft, McGarm with Heine, Jameson with Keats. Methodologically, he is
self-aware about what it means to focus on such "representative" figures: he
seeks to track the dialectic through which contemporary critic and romantic
writer constitute and "mutually transform each other" (9).
The book is also methodologically attuned to the ways in which the lessons of historicism and the lessons of deconstructive reading might address
each other. The chapter on the methodological and political contours of Romanticist New Historicism, for example, tracks through McGann's Romantic
Ideology "the sublimity of a historical error that underwrites historical knowledge" (105). Wang sees historical knowledge, that is, as approachable only
through error: lithe possibility of historical difference operates as an aporia of
historical thought, a condition that testifies to the radical indeterminacy of
historical difference as a stable form of human truth" (3); but error is also the
condition of possibility of historical thinking at all. In the case of The Romantic IdeologtJ, Wang focuses on the consequences of McGann's misidentification
of his historical project with that of Heinrich Heine, a misidentification that
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exposes McGann's ambivalent relationship to Marxism, the conflicts between
rus various "materialisms," and the recalcitrance of what Wang sees as
McGann's "covert" or "uninterrogated" commitment to an "emancipatory
Romanticism" (81). By exploring Romanticist New Historicism's often unacknowledged allegiances to particular versions of the past and present, its
allegiance to an Enlightenment "modernity" and an attendant "progressive
futurity" (104), Wang is able to identify some of its theoretical weaknesses
and symptomatic moves.
Wang's dialectic between historical and rhetorical reading is in evidence as
well in his ambitious chapter on de Man. Here, he reads "Shelley Disfigured" with "The Triumph of Life," using Shelley's poem to tackle the political context of de Man's extraordinary essay-and by extension the whole
controversy about the relationship of de Man's writing to the grim "modernity" of fascism. Wang's approach to this topic (which is contextualized by an
illuminating discussion, in the preceding chapter, of A. O. Lovejoy and Leo
Spitzer's 1940's debate about the relations among Romanticism, fascism, and
cultural transmission: these are not new issues to Romantic shldies) is inflected by his book's persistent interest in the relationship between theory
and practice, or the correspondence between words and deeds, thought and
action. He argues that the historical significance of de Man's take on these
matters in "Shelley Disfigured" depends on restoring to Shelley's poem a
sense of the politics that lie behind "The Triumph of Life's-and by extension de Man's-radical skepticism. Focusing on the presence of both Rousseau and (ingeniously but less convincingly) Edmund Burke in the poem, he
reads "Triumph" as a profoundly post-Enlightenment and post-Napoleonic
document, ambivalent about the possibility of revolutionary rupture, and
critical precisely of revolutionary gestures that forget their own rhetoricity,
that assume an easy transition from words to deeds. This, according to
Wang, is the lesson "Triumph" might teach us about how to think about the
relationship between de Man's words and his earlier deeds: that words and
deeds "coexist simultaneously in an actively intolerable disjunction" (66).
And this is the political tradition-what Wang calls "the crisis of the Jacobin
imaginary" (65)-to which de Man belongs. Some readers may feel that
Wang's reading (which I've necessarily simplified) runs the risk of effectively disabling his ability to say anything substantive about de Man's politics; others will applaud his demonstration of how excruciatingly difficult it
is to say anything on this topic at all.
Wang's chapter on feminism and Romanticism differs from the rest in that
it doesn't-symptomatically-focus on a single contemporary critic. But in
its attention to twentieth-century feminism's relationship to Enlightenment,
modernity, and praxis, and to Romanticist feminists' concern with the politics of transmission, the chapter forges important continuities between feminist scholarship and the concerns of the book as a whole. Wang continues to
work out the mutually constituting "excesses" (9) between contemporary
and Romantic writers, in this case focusing on the missed conjunctions between Wollstonecraft's Vindication of the Rights of Woman and the concerns of
feminist Romanticists. Arguing that contemporary readers may have erred in
seeing Wollstonecraft as caught up in binary thinking that hypostasizes male
and female, and in particular masculinity with reason and femininity with
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passion, Wang details the profoundly anti-essentialist nature of her thought.
While his close readings of Wollstonecraft are excellent, he does not do justice to the range of recent approaches to Wollstonecraft in both literary studies and political theory. Moreover, his treatment of the relationship of
passion and reason in her work will seem less consequential if contextualized by an understanding of the deeply entrenched place of passion within
Enlightenment political thought. Still, Wang mobilizes his reading of Wollstonecraft to suggest the crucial interventions a feminist Romanticism canin addition to, say, recovering the work of women writers-make: its crucial
role in self-reflexively derealizing the meanings of both "Romanticism" and
gender," its potential to mobilize the aporias of its own acts of recovery for
a retheorization of both terms.
Some readers will value Fantastic Modernity for its engagements with individual texts, both literary and critical; for others its importance will lie in its
sustained attention to the elusive, fantastic nature of historical change-and
hence the shifting understandings of the relation between theory and practice-within Romanticism. It is Wang's attention to these persistent issues
that convinces us why and how Romanticist criticism continues to be on the
forefront of contemporary thought.
/I

Adela Pinch

University of Michigan

Formal Charges: The Shaping of Poetry in British Romanticism by Susan Wolfson.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997. Pp. xi + 344. $39.50.

What kinds of "charges" are "formal"? We might think immediately of a
charge to a jury in its deliberations of innocence and guilt, or a formal charge
of criminal wrongdoing offered to a charged" suspect. Indeed, we might
well wonder about the laying of charges and the imputation of guilt when
discovering that this tome is about form and style in Romantic poetry, and
poetry of the high canon, at that. What could be guiltier? Susan Wolfson has
entered a deeply contentious and vexed field in this book, for in it she seeks
to revisit the old conundrums of poetic form in British poetry and the strange
history of critical and theoretical responses to the formalist nature of Romantic poetry. This is already a charged ground, explosive in its rhetoric and
wide-ranging in its apportioning of blame. All the same, in defiance of the
pervasiveness (as she reads it) of the charge that formalist poetry is complicit
with the worst forms of ideological co-optation and specious social indoctrination, Wolfson claims to get a charge out of the formal. This is a quiet and
delightful surprise, and indeed we ought to be even more surprised at just
how novel it sometimes seems to be: ur want to make a case for the pleasures, intellectual and aesthetic, of attending to the complex charges of form
in poetic writing" (2). Explain to anyone but another professional literary
theorist that you need to "make a case" for the pleasures of form in poetry
and you will be charged with ... insanity. And so Wolfson's careful historicizing of our current state of affairs in this respect is important and welcome.
H
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Susan Wolfson situates herself as a critic who seems tired already of the
old arguments about formalist procedure as bad, bad, bad, and who thus
wants to get on with the business of reminding herself and her readers just
why we even bothered getting so excited about the practice of reading in the
first place. She sets to work actually reading canonical Romantic poems, and
she does a good job of this. Further, in offering clear-sighted engagements
with poetic texts, she seeks to "offer this method as theory in action" (1). I
would question the latter formulation, because there is in fact nothing elaborately theorized about the particular ways in whicl1 she here attends to the
sounds and textures of form. Her theoretical inveshnents instead rely primarily on a commitment to stylistic and thematic deciphering which, she
hopes, does not neglect the historicity of the text. In this, her close reading,
and her defense of it, do constitute an urgent polemic, even a defiant one. In
contesting, for example, Terry Eagleton'S complaints about lyric as "ideologically resolvable form," she leaves no doubt about the ground she is staking
out: "Too many readers today accept Eagleton'S marginalizing, sin1plifying,
or simply dismissive attention to poetic form as a labour of 'reductive operation,' an exercise 'preoccupied simply with analyzing linguistic devices.' I
want to refute the myopia in1plied by 'reductive' and 'preoccupied' and the
triviality in1plied by 'simply,' by demonstrating how, in the critical perspectives that have evolved after New Criticism, attention to form can articulate
issues often felt to be inimical: not only the factitiousness of organic coherence, closed designs, and cognitive totality, but also the construction of
forms in relation to subjectivity, cultural ideology, and social circumstance"
(19). That makes for a big project indeed.
Wolfson's sense of form is perhaps overly sensitive to the vulnerability
faced by all critics seeking to refresh formalist analysis: she is a little on the
defensive about the historicist valence of the poems she interrogates, and so
many of her arguments proceed, perhaps inadvertently, as indirect defences
of the political implications of the text after all. Charged as formal, they are
largely defended as forms with extra (historical) charge. Still, this is not always her strategy, and so a fully consistent theoretical stance is not perfectly
discernable here. I would add, however, that variances in approach of this
sort are not necessarily problematic, because one of the primary claims of
this book is precisely that literature ought not to be reduced to oversimplified preconceptions of context and contingency. Some poems may well be
merely nasty pieces of ideological work; others subvert their received social
premises; still others intentionally signal, rather than efface, their suppressed
historical referents. For Wolfson, then, the work of reading is the work of
discerning nuance and difference from text to text.
The first chapter, "Formal Intelligence: Formalism, Romanticism, and Formalist Criticism" provides an interesting overview of the fortunes of formalist writing in academic criticism for most of this century. Wolfson skillfully
traces the New Criticism's dialectical engagements with the (old) historicism
that preceded it, hence rescuing Brooks, Warren, and Company from the
charge of having blithely ignored all extratextual realities. Further, she
shows that, for example, "it is important to recognize that Brooks did not say
that studying poetry refused history and culture, only that the former required different kinds and sequences of attention" (8). Likewise, she corrects
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the oversimplified view. that "organic form" is most of the story of Romantic
formalism, and she cautions against the sentimentalized reduction of the
poets to silly naifs writing in spontaneous effusions: "Romantic texts are
more various than monolithic, and their poetic practices are alert to form as

a construction" (23).
Thus it is that she studies Blake's Poetical Sketches in terms of a self-referentiality that is also insistently a can to praxis, for his formal practices "are
actions that call readers to a critical awareness of the work of form, not only
in poetic but also in cognitive, social, and historical processes" (32). Coleridge, the very figure who is most associated with the institutionalization of
aU the sensitive aspects of form (symbol, organicism, to name only two), is
studied from the perspective of his use of simile. The simile is a figure that
advertises its nonidentity with the Signified, and so relentlessly asserts its
own self-awareness qua (failed) equation. Wolfson's careful attention to Coleridge'S processes in this regard enables her to produce an historicany inflected rescue: "Coleridge's persistent turns and returns to simile are the
signature of an imagination always given to reading its world, in various
degrees, in formations of like and as. And the remarkable boldness of this
signature is its projection of a formalist criticism worked through the instabilities of organic form and its ideological commitments" (99).
These are important readings, but here we might pause to ask all the
same: does Coleridge's remarkable manipulation of simile in fact signify a
working through of ideology? Here again there is the sign, perhaps, of an
over-defensiveness, where form is read as a self-conscious way of virtually
rejecting itself. This is in no way to dispute her careful readings of the political and social conditions of poetic economies; it is, however, to open up further the question about the relation of poetry to praxis. Wolfson herself is
wen aware of this potential for defensiveness; in the afterword she does end
by "urging attention to form not only defensively, in terms of its potential
agency within and against the cultural regimes that Bourdieu describes, but
also affirmatively" (232). And indeed, the discussion of Wordsworth's revisions in The Prelude to the "drowned man of Esthwaite" scene certainly does
escape any critical oversensitivity to the political meaning of formalist work.
This is a particularly meticulous chapter, fun of careful calibrations of the
text's manuscript history, though one that seems to privilege the psychologized subject over the forms of its articulations.
The chapter on Byron studies his use of the heroic couplet in The Corsair,
in which the poet's "social existence" is performed in ways that answer directly to Jerome McGann's oft-cited call for readings that turn aesthetic experience into self-consciously critical understanding (135). Keats is brought
forward, especiany in his post-Great Odes phase (in the poems to Fanny
Brawne), as "moving tluough and beyond this kind of formalism [that of
Endymion] into an investigation of poetic forms as factitious, temporary, and
historicaUy situated, thoroughly implicated with systems of experience and
processes of language that they cannot transcend" (192). The final chapter
studies P. B. Sheney's The Mask of Anarchy alongside the fmal lyrics addressed to Jane and Edward Williams. Here we have what is taken to be the
paradigm for a formalist poetry that is intimately responsive to its social environment and to the pressures of a deeply felt context, one whose echoes
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can be discerned even in the intensely private world of the lyric gift to a
friend. It is worth spending some real lime with this chapter; indeed, in the
introduction to the book, Wolfson looks forward to showing that "Shelley's
socially contextualized poetic forms write an agenda for a contextualized formalist criticism" (29).
Whether or not one ultimately agrees that the happiest form is one amenable to contextualist critique, this is a worthwhile agenda, and Wolfson has
therefore written an important book. Its strangest omission, however, is the
absence of any full recognition of the pioneering work performed by Stuart
Curran in his magisterial book, Poetic Form and British Romanticism (1986).
There Curran sets his attention to somewhat different matters, but much of
what Wolfson argues will still need to be measured, at least partly, against
Curran's formidable example. Curran, unlike Wolfson, is interested in the
full historical and ideological provenance of Romantic forms; a reading of
the contextuaIized character of Romantic poetry would benefit immensely
from a dialogue with Curran's work.
This is not to suggest that Wolfson has not written an original and engaging study. Her call for a refreshed look at nuance and detail, and her example of a loving engagement with the texts we spend our lives with, will be
with us, I hope, for a long time.

University of Tom11/o

Karen A. Weisman

Urban Verbs: Art and Discourse of American Cities by Kevin R. McNamara.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996. Pp. v + 310. $39.50.

In a time when concern over historical context seems to control the theory
that drives interdisciplinary methods, it is refreshing to see a work that attempts to deal with the importance of space as well as that of time. McNamara's work investigates the city-in most cases New York-not as a setting,
but as a kind of protagonist. The city is not reduced to being simply a place
where things happen, but the city, in its own right, "happens." The city effects change, creates tension, embodies contradiction. Through an investigation of literary and visual texts, the author reveals and explores the "conflicts
that careful discursive arguments conceal" (5). By highlighting the complexity and confusion inherent in urban cultural space, we may begin to explore
how cities make material certain discourses of agency. Cities are not just
places in which humans interacti they are spaces which, having been constructed within a context of particular discourses, come to embody, maintain, and challenge these discourses in ways that affect cultural experience.
The book's six chapters are paired in such a way that the first chapter of
each couple provides an example of a text in which conflict has been concealed. The second chapter of each paired set illustrates "an understanding
of the uses of the apparent disorder [in urban space1and a recognition of the
often unconscious negotiation of difference" (6). Rather than being set up as
three binary oppositions, then, each case explores a particular aspect of the
materiality of the city. The first pairing provides two perspectives on New
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York at the tnm of the centnry. Henry James's The American Scene is cited for
being "traversed by nostalgia," unable to grant any positive slant to the
changes being brought about by the polyphonic effects of the influx of immigrants and the shift in power structure from old money to new money. Theodore Dreiser's Sister Carrie, however, recognizes and attempts to deal with
the complexities of a polyphonic urbanism by using the discourses of social
science to illustrate the tension "between inevitability and intervention" (76).
McNamara nods to the topic of gender in the second pairing through an investigation of how language genders not only people but place and space. In
his architectural renderings in The Metropolis of Tomorrow, Hugh Ferriss's
drawings illustrate the notion of the "Ferrissian womb," the menta] space of
the architect where pure ideas are conceived and from which they are born.
In contrast, the means by which William Carlos Williams represents the concept of marriage in his urban epic, Paterson, gives the poem a new geography," one that displaces marriage with dissonance (168). The final pairing
presents the human population as integral to the life of the city. The nair
film The Naked City (directed by Jules Dassin) adequately presents the viewer
with the violence and chaos of the city's underside, but in being presented as
only one of "eight million stories," the viewer can relax and enjoy the closure
provided by the singling out of this story as an anomaly. On the other hand,
the poslrnodem buildings of Robert Ventnri and Denise Scott Brown provide
us with examples of how to understand that the eight million possible stories are always under "(re)construction" (210) and that closure never really
exists in urban space.
Perhaps more interesting than each particular textual investigation is how
the form of the book reinforces the argument that agency lies within conflict,
within complexity. This idea opposes the strand of Marxist thought which
conceives of power as being seated squarely within the superstructure. For
the base to effect any change whatsoever, an all-out revolution is required.
The problem with this logic is that it denies power to any group that has not
claimed agency in the same manner as the hegemony. In such a view of hegemony, power can be neither indecision, conflict, nor complexity; it is decision, resolution, and simplicity. McNamara illustrates that, on the contrary,
power can ofte.n reside within complexity; the works of Dreiser, Williams,
Ventnri, and Scott Brown highlight this point. It is in works that allow the
city an agency by means of negotiation between and among competing discourses, rather than in those that illustrate a Jamesian nostalgia for simplicity
and truth, that we may begin to envision the power of conflict and complexity.
Two concepts invite this text into a larger academic conversation: those of
space and of the subaltern. If Foucault has written that "it may be space
more than time that hides consequences from us," an investigation into the
"city as protagonist" is an excellent way to situate power within the city and
to uncover meanings hidden by specific discourses, those of "time" and "history" to name only two. Unfortunately, neither the texts that are meant to illustrate closure, nor those chosen to provide examples of conflict, are
approached any differently in the way they are read. Formalist textnal analysis, which pays attention to character development, language, form, shading,
and plot, and soon, overshadows the subject of the book: the city. Despite
If
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the author's claims that this work presents the city as protagonist, the city as
agent is often lost in argulnents about Carrie's motivation or Williams's use
of language.
This is not to say that there is no evidence here of the city as an agent of
power. When the book works with the notions of space, it joins with the recent work of scholars such as Edward Soja and Derek Gregory. Soja's Postmodem Geographies and Gregory's Geographical Imaginations emphasize the
importance and power of actual, physical space as the site for material rhetoric. Following their work, McNamara's chapter "Building Culture" examines
the shift in architectural styles in terms of changes that came about as the
United States experienced an increase in the numbers of wealthy citizens.
This new money did not, however, wish to emulate the behavior of old
money and remain behind closed doors in private homes, sequestered and
hidden; as a result, the country club and luxury hotel found their way into
urban culture. McNamara regards these spaces as physical manifestations of
beliefs and desires, permitting the reader to see how the materiality of the
building, not simply its depiction in literature (or even in renderings), takes
part in the discourse of the city.
Subaltern power, as discussed by Gayatri Spivak, may be thought of as the
power and agency claimed by the oppressed. Instead of being at the mercy
of hegemonic power, the oppressed are viewed as having agency that stems
from their particular position and intimate knowledge of their place in society. While Spivak's work remains specific to colonial India, her ideas apply
to the context of other minority groups or peoples that are generally considered lacking in political and social power. Urban Verbs insightfully presents
complexity and conflict as an indication of the presence of power, but rarely
is the power located in physical buildings or in relation to oppressed or
dominated groups. This lack has much to do with the subject matter of the
book, which is not a work on race, class, or gender, as noted in McNamara's
preference for texts about New York City rather than texts that are of New
York City. He investigates works that embody hegemonic power (The American Scene, hotels, country clubs, and skyscrapers), but does not give voice to
works that embody the subaltern power to which he alludes (tenements,
graffiti, immigration records or journals, and so on). Even so, his work provides a set of blueprints for a potentially exceptional theoretical idea: that
the conflict and complexity noted in the relationship between hegemonic
spaces and oppressed peoples may indeed reveal a site of subaltern power.
In theorizing the materiality of space, rather than its representation, we
indeed open ourselves to being able to observe people, places, and things
that are often rendered invisible, silent, and unknowable. Howeverf many
questions remain. To whom does the city speak? Are we all capable of understanding her language? It seems that though we are able to explore the
complexities of material rhetoricf we do not yet have a language to describe
nonlinguistic material discourse. We may also encounter an ethical dilemma
in our desire to uncover the sites of subaltern power: in the act of examiningf
and thereby exposingf subaltern powerf will we not be culpable of rendering
such power impotent? Perhaps, if the subject is the subaltern of the present,
we may. In turning our attention to those subjects as historicat howeverf
such investigation provides not only an expanded understanding of certain
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historical moments, but also the means by which we may begin to disc()\'l'r
how materiality and the subaltern speak. UrlJaIl Verbs deals with historic,ll
texts. It is in a contextualized history that the subject of space may indced
gain ground as a relevant site for scholarly investigation.
\VaYlle Siale

UllivCI"sity

Amy K. ivt. Hawkins

Postcards frolll fhe Trcllchcs: Ncgofialil1S Ihc Spacc /lcfweclI A10demisIII nlllt Ih('
Firsl VI/orIn \"Iar by Allyson Booth. NeVI' York: Oxford Univcrsity Prcss, 1996.

Pp. x + 186. $35.00.
Nearly all literary criticism of the First World War contends, either directly or indirectly, vl/ith Paul Fussell's classic account in The Creal 'Var alld
At/emory (London: Oxford University Press, 1975). Indeed, the status
of Fussell's thesis in studies of the war can hardly be overstated: although in
rare cases critics do dispute Fussell's argument that "there seems to be nne
dominating form of modern understanding; that it is essentially ironic; and
that it originates largely in the application of rnind ,md memory to the
cvents of the Great VVar," modernist scholars on the \vhole have (Iccepted as
a premise the Fussellian notion of a constitutive relation between the deep,
conceptual trauma wrought by the war and the fragmentary, disorienting
nature of high modernism. (Two recent critics, however, have provnci1tivl'ly
challenged important aspects of Fussell's thesis, Adrian Ci1esar argues tlul
the conventional re(lding of \'\'ilfred 0\'1'1211, Siegfried Sasso on, (lnd Robert
Graves as antiwar poets fails to account for the valorization of violence and
suffering in their poetry; he thus places these ci1nonical figures i1longsidl'
Rupert Brooke (rather than in opposition to the pi1triotic poet) (IS proponL'nts
of i1 troubling and angry 111i1sculinity; TakillS It Like a hlall: SlI/fcrill,\!" Sr:nwfi11/, alld flit' \Val' Pods (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 199.3). Joanna
13nurke contesls Fussell's Cli1i111 that a l1"'1isogynistic and alienated sensibility
reigned among soldiers and veterans. For Bourke, the vasl l1li1jority of fighting Illen continued to hold esscnti.Jlly traditional notions of gender and S(lci,lI organizi1tion, tlnd were ci1gcr to rebuild their domestic eslablishnll'1lts
along conventional lines; Dislllell/herillX Ille Male: Mell's Bodies, Britaill, tlllt! lilt"
Grcol \ Vllr (Chic.1g0: Uni\'crsity of Chicago Press, 1996). Such <111 apprn<1ch In
llH1lkrni:-;1ll stresses (orilla I i1nd thematic departures fmlll lill'r.1ry Ir,lditinll
(\\·hal S,l1l1111:,1 Hynes, in his encyclopedic study of the W.1r i11ld English culture, describes .1:-; i1 rupture with the ptlst; /\ \Var IIIIIlSillcr!: Til,' rir.~1 \\'(Irld
\\'111" 1111r1 EII~lis'l Culturc (Londtlll: Bodle,' HCJd, 1990). gl'ner,llh- '·,ll(lrizl'~ tIll'
11ll1dernist ~tleillpt I() elllbr.1cc idl'as oj· fracture and ~iissnn'"'IllCl\ ,1Ild Il'!ld~
ttl\\",uds an inkgr,ltin' and s,'nthctic 111odl'l of mndl'rnism th.11 mlnimizc ...
diffl'fl'nCt':' .1nH)I~g \\·ritL'f:' (nf'natioll. gL'ndl'r, .lnd cl.1S~. f()r inst,1J1l'l'j. \\\\ft·\1\·\'f. nitics "'ho pl.1Cl' thl' \,·,lr ,11 tIll' cru\: of.1 IlWdlTlli~t ~l'n~ibiJit~· t~Til·.llly
dl'l'mrh,1Sii'"t' tilt' ~tlCi,11 ,1n(\ Jitl'rary Uphl'.1\·,11." pf thl' turn nl" tIlt' Ct'ntur}',
dtl'l-ti\"l'I~' minimil"ing thl' imptlrt,11Kl' Itlr liter.lr:: ChflllWI(l~~y pI ... ueh fl)~l1rI·'"
.1S \\·i1dc, CI)nr.ld, ,1Ild I.lI11l's. ,md PI' Ihl' sl',-u,11 .1nd (1.1 ....... pllli!ic,- "I :11\' 1"'rill.l ,Hllllnd lOOll.
Modem
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Allyson Booth's Postcards from the Trenches: Negotiating the Space between
Modernism and the First World War embraces this tradition, and can be read as
an amplification and expansion of Fussell's thesis: her essential argument is
that "the Great War was experienced by soldiers as strangely modernist and
that modernism itself is strangely haunted by the Great War" (6). If the standard notion of modernism situates the war as a crucial watershed event,
Booth's study goes further, arguing that the defining formal and thematic elements of modernism derive directly from a conceptual reorientation
brought on by the war. Booth recognizes that many critics credit the war
with establishing a certain mood or aura within modernist texts, yet she depicts these accounts as "hazy" (139) and over-general, inattentive to the specific and profound ways in which the war destabilized systems of thought
and language. In place of a general description of postwar sensibility, then,
Booth offers a detailed analysis of an array of conceptual problems in war
discourse-generally focusing on the body in space and time-which she
then compares with a host of civilian modernist writings. "Modernism ...
tries to internalize the perceptual and imaginative repercussions of war/' she
writes, "to transform them into imaginative material and at the same time
always to point toward the battlefield, toward the physical experience of
war, and toward the body" (162). Booth's aim is not so much to challenge or
redirect dominant ideas about modernism as to enrich and illuminate a discussion that has become relatively commonplace. Thus, if her claim about
the influence of the war on civilian modernism remains conventional, her
methodology is contemporary: she studies a broad range of texts and practices that cut across diSciplinary boundaries, including, for instance, a discussion of both Gennan and English rhetoric surrounding the invasion of
Belgium; analysis of war memorials; and a section on postwar movements in
British and continental architecture (the International Style and German expressionism).
Booth's study becomes most original----even riveting-when she focuses on
general categories of thought and language during the war years, pinpointing the connections between the physical conditions of war and such notions
as time, space, factuality, and representation. Postcards from the Trenches is
organized according to a series of binaries, whose very headings indicate the
freshness of Booth's approach: corpses and corpselessness; encirclement and
penetration; factuality and unknowability; maps and geographical chaos;
chronology and the disruption of time; transparency and opacity. In each
case, Booth discusses a range of contradictions that characterized combatant
experience on the western front (represented most bracingly in the work of
such well-known writers as Sassoon, Owen, Graves, and Edmund Blunden)
and then discusses parallel developments in the literature of civilian modernists (including Virginia Woolf, James Joyce, D. H. Lawrence, T. S. Eliot, E.
M. Forster, Willa Cather, Wallace Stevens, and Katherine Mansfield). While
Booth follows Fussell in focusing on the extreme polarity separating combatant experience from home life, her important move is to credit civilian modernists with intuiting this very discrepancy, and with attempting to capture
and explore it in their work. Thus modernism for Booth represents a direct
engagement on the part of civilian artists with the extreme disorientation

Criticism, Vol. XL, no. 1: Book Reviews

159

and contradictoriness experienced by both combatants and civilians during
the war.
As an example, the first section of the book ("The Shape of Bodies") focuses on the disjunction between the omnipresence of corpses at the front
and the extreme absence of the soldier's body back at home. In a discussion
that recalls Eric Leed's influential study of the war (No Man's Land: Combat
and Identity in World War I [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979]),
Booth examines the enormously problematic status of the dying, dead, mutilated, and often unrecognizable body at the scene of war. As Leed has
shown, the collapse of distinctions between such ordinarily disparate states
as life/death, wholeness/fragmentation, and self/other created a psychological configuration with long-lasting ramifications for individual combatants.
Booth is lucid in her discussion of such shifts in experience and perception,
convincingly suggesting that existential dilemmas surrounding the coherence of the individual self have origins in the material conditions of the
trenches. Moreover, Booth posits a great irony in the fact that for civilians,
the war represented a period of extreme (and distressing) removal from soldiers' bodies. Far from being immersed in the physical carnage of the front,
civilians remained entirely separated from the corpses that so dominated
combatant life; even the ordinary conventions of burial and memorial were
maSSively disrupted by a war in which bodies were not brought back to England for interment. Booth argues that this striking loss of innumerable male
bodies becomes the focus for civilian modernists such as Woolf Uacob's
Room) and Cather (The Professor's House), who create elaborate architectural
spaces to house and memorialize the absent corpse. The problem of corpselessness (and its ironic contrast with combatant experience) also dominates
the development of war memorials. Booth's analysis of these architectural
monuments-and more generally of postwar debates surrounding the practice of commemoration-suggests interesting and surprising parallels with
the bracketed male bodies of modernist fiction.
Yet there are drawbacks to Booth's methodology. Most troubling is her
complete devotion to the structure of parallelism (the "just as" formulation
figures repeatedly in each chapter, becoming mechanical over time): she relies consistently on the notion that the parallels between war experience and
modernist tropes constitute an important argument about modernism. Thus,
for instance, in her discussion of A Passage to India, we find repeated-yet
over-general and unconvincing-assertions of a strong connection between
war discourse and Forster's primary concerns: "The issue of sexual assault
stands at the center of both the events of August 1914 and the events in
E. M. Forster's A Passage to India, published ten years later" (76); "McBryde's
ominous suggestion that 'these times' require unusual precautions, his patronizing tone, and Mrs. Callendar's willing retreat to the safety of male protection were all familiar patterns of relations between the sexes during the
Great War" (78), "Just as the caves collapse meaningful distinctions by reducing all sounds and all voices ... to mere 'ou-boum/ the war represents
an ethical black hole for Forster, sucking up possible meanings that then disappear forever" (81). While new approaches to such highly canonical texts as
A Passage to India are always desirable, the problem here is the tenuousness
of the alleged connections: the sexual politics that dominate Forster's novel
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can be contextualized in a variety of ways, only one (and perhaps not the
most central) of which involves the war. Moreover, to draw a parallel between the crisis of the caves and the "ethical black hole" of the war-while
provocative-seems to raise more questions than it answers about the way
in which the war's chaotic atmosphere became embedded in a larger cultural
dialogue, and about Forster's own novelistic appropriation of wartime crises
in morality and epistemology.
Indeed, Booth's tendency to structure her argument as a series of allusive
comparisons at times threatens to flatten and homogenize the literary material she hopes to illuminate. If one accepts her premise about the importance
of the war for modernism's conceptual universe, one naturally wants to
know more about how modernists transformed, refigured, aestheticized, and
-perhaps most centrally-appropriated such problems for their own artistic
purposes. Thus if a text like The Waste Land clearly resonates with the war
(a conventional point amplified by Booth), Eliot's very thematization of the
poetics of transformation calls for further exploration. To recognize modernism's indebtedness to the war in this new, full manner functions as an important starting point, but leaves unanswered crucial questions about how
modernism both represented and superseded the war's effects. After all,
what is perhaps most remarkable about the narrative that emerges here is
the success with which civilian modernists obscured their debt to the war,
creating their magnificent literary edifice in its very place. As an exploration
of the way the war ultimately endorsed or authorized modernism, then,
Postcards from the Trenches remains incomplete. Yet as a discussion of the
war's role in both destabilizing and creating conceptual categories, and as a
corrective to an overly deracinated critical approach to modernism, Booth's
study is highly rewarding.
Ohio University

Sarah Cole

Science, Jews, and Secular Culture: Studies in Mid-Twentieth-Century American
Intellectual History by David A. Hollinger. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1996. Pp. 178. $24.95.
David Hollinger's previous study in the history of ideas, Pastethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism (New York: BasicBooks, 1995), emerged from the
mid-1990s affirmative action emergency at rus home institution, the University of California. It was written, Hollinger says, "in the belief that Americans need to push yet harder against the authority that shape and color have
historically been allowed by society to exert over culture" (x). Now, in the
essays collected in Science, Jews, and Secular Culture, Hollinger considers the
cultural effects of one such push: the abrupt end of anti-Jewish hiring discrimination on the faculties of America's elite universities in the wake of the
Holocaust.
The bare statistic is dramatic enough. Hollinger takes his para~igmatic
numbers from Dan Oren's study of Yale: "There were a scattering of Jews in
the university's profeSSional schools prior to World War II, but ... within
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the faculty of Yale College itself-the culturally strategic core of the university-no Jew held the rank of professor until 1946. In that year the philosopher Paul Weiss was appointed .... In 1950 Weiss remained Yale College's
sale Jewish professor, although by then eight other Jews held that rank in
Yale as a whole. But by 1960 the transition was visibly underway: 28 of the
university's 260 professors were Jewish, including 6 out of 95 professors in
the college .... In 1970, 22 percent of the professors in the university were
Jewish, as were 18 percent of the professors in the college" (7-8). TI,is demographic change, Hollinger contends, is worth thinking about as the indicator
of a change in American culture as a whole: a "transition from Protestant
culture to pluralism" (21).
The value of Hollinger's thought here lies in his understanding that that
cultural change was "mediated .. contingent, historically specific" (15).
This historical specificity Hollinger explores by documenting it as a history
of ideas. So, for instance, he aims to help us understand why it mattered for
the sociologist Robert K. Merton to assert in 1942 that (in Hollinger's words)
lithe moral values for which science [is] ostensibly a vehicle [are] intrinsic to
science" (92). Merton's idea that there is a relation between science and democracy now seems, as Hollinger says, "naive or uninteresting," if not disingenuous in its blindness to the relation between science and power (81-82).
But in 1942 moral values weren't what they are today. If they were compatible with the cultural parochialism of America's universities, perhaps that
was a sign that they too were parochial. Merton's claim for the universal
applicability of scientific value was thus specifically political, and specifically
applicable to history as it was revealing itself in 1942.
So Merton's contribution came to be one of the classic social-scientific texts
during the era of Jewish assimilation, and as it effected its changes its own
language was enabled to change accordingly. In 1942 Merton's essay rode
into ideological combat under the polemical title of "A Note on Science
and Democracy," but by 1973, when it had become a part of the textual establishment, it was "The Normative Structure of Science" (82). For Merton,
this laying claim to a universal content was the sign of a change more ftmdamentally than Hollinger himself realized. Hollinger wrote this chapter of Science, Jews, and Secular Culture in 1980 and published it in 1983, but it wasn't
until 1994 that he learned that Robert K. Merton was born Meyer H. Schkolnick (81).
Science, Jews, and Secular Culture is only incidentally concerned with language, but it seems to me to have great value as a textbook of reading. Consider, for instance, Hollinger's analysis of After Strange Gods, a series of
lechues about literature and culture that T. S. Eliot delivered at the University of Virginia in 1933, published in 1934, and then withdrew from publication. Part of a single sentence on p. 20 of Eliot's little book has become
notorious-" reasons of race and religion combine to make any large number
of free-thinking Jews undesirable" -but for the most part that notoriety has
issued only in linguistic skirmishes: defensive readings by (for recent instance) Christopher Ricks, counterattacks by (for recent instance) Anthony
Julius. Read in the context of its paragraph, let alone the context of European
history in 1933, Eliot's formulation certainly seems vile beyond any defense
based on words. Hollinger, however, has done the pedagogically correct
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thing and read Eliot historically, in perhaps the most historiographically satisfactory way since World War II. Such a reading allows Hollinger to help us
understand that Eliot "was correct to single out Jews, especially freethinking
Jews, as a unique threat in the 1930s to the realization in the United States of
a Christian community of the sort in which Eliot-and not Eliot alonewould have preferred to live" (18).
That I can now dare to use the word "vile" about one of the greatest poets
in the English language may indicate that Hollinger's history has gone on to
a triumphantly happy ending. Grounds for such a hopeful belief are certainly an ordinary part of American society today. Robert K. Merton revealed the truth about his name himself, for instance, in an autobiography
which it would have been suicidal to publish in 1933 or 1934 or 1942. But
perhaps the time will come again when Eliot's way of looking at the world
has more practical consequence than Merton's. It certainly is true, at any
rate, that American Jewish inteIlectuals have some reason for their current
loss of nerve. It's harder than it once was be a Zionist, now that Israel's few
remaining non-Jewish supporters tend so disconcertingly to be literalminded Protestants checking off the countdown to Armageddon. It's harder
to be a liberal in a time of ethnic self-aggrandizement-especially now that
there aren't enough Jews left to be worth considering a minority. And of
course the American academy has plenty of reason for its own loss of nerve.
Hollinger doesn't see it as his purpose to draw attention to the fact, but the
American professoriat, as an economic class, is now dying. The figures for
employment of new PhD.s demonstrate something not predicted by the dictionary: a crisis can last for thirty years.
In retrospect from this side of the crisis, it appears approximately true that
Jews ceased making a culturally distinct contribution to the life of the American mind-qun Jews, not just as Americans of the Jewish religion-in 1967.
That was the year when the New York intellectual Norman Podhoretz published his swaggering memoir Making It, but it was also the year when Israel
committed the unforgivable gaffe of winning a war it was supposed to lose.
One year later the academic job market collapsed, and neither the community of Jewish intellectuals nor the institution where it made its home has
been the same since. Hollinger's history is therefore unavoidably suffused
with nostalgia. The book's dust jacket, for instance, is decorated with a
group photograph of J. Robert Oppenheimer, James Bryant Conant, and Vannevar Bush at Harvard in 1948-al1 in black tie, and Oppenheimer in a wing
collar. Why are they here? A caption informs us: "All were centrally involved in the building of the atomic bomb during World War II, and in postwar discussions of the role of science in American culture and society."
Beyond those faclual data, Princeton University Press offers no further explanation. And after all, explanation isn't necessary, because the faces and
the body language in the photograph say all that has to be said. This turns
out to be a single \vord, unspoken but unmistakably clear. Twenty years earlier, the word \vould have been Jew, and the picture accordingly couldn't
h<1ve been t<lken. By 1948, however, the word was simply Power.
But the process of tr<1nsbtion didn't stop then. Things have changed for
the Jewish intellectual community since Oppenheimer looked into the lens
th<lt evening half a century ago, but in Sciellce, Jews, alld Secular Cliltllre you
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won't find the reasons why. To say this, however, is only to say that Hollinger has written less a history of ideas than a history of events at a halfway
point. This history carries its subject from scorn to triumph, then ends. The
second half of the story will need another book to tell, but the half that Hollinger has given us in Science, Jews, and Secular Culture is valuable on its own
terms.
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German Cultural Studies: An Introduction, edited by Rob Burns. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. Pp. xi + 375. $18.95.

Rob Burns and the other fourteen scholars in German Cultural Studies: An
Introduction reinforce the Frankfurt School's importance for Cultural Studies
in charting the liberating and confining functions of cultural institutions during the late nineteenth cenmry and the twentieth century in the German
states. Individuals of various backgrounds, classes, and sexes have constructed these vehicles for negotiating values and social identities and thus
for channeling economic and political power through urbanization and the
loosening of feudal bonds.
Burns's introduction sets the tone for the volume as a whole. For him, Germany's late establishment as an industrial and unified state, its fascist period
after a democratic awakening, and its post World War II restructurings provide fascinating material with which to test Max Horkheimer and Theodor
Adorno's notions of mass culture. Robin Lenman, John Osborne, and Eda
Sagarra investigate how, in the case of imperial Germany, the educated middle class, the Bildungsbiirgertum, coalesces and shapes cultural identity
through expanding publishing houses, through printing more works such as
Goethe's Faust, through opening libraries, journals, newspapers, museums,
and cinemas (chap. 1). Stephen Lamb and Anthony Phelan track the modernist achievements of Germany's middle class in establishing a democracy and
in supporting the SOcially critical art reflected by the paintings of Otto Dix,
the plays of Bertolt Brecht, Marieluise Fleiller, and Friedrich Wolf, and by
the films of Richard Oswald, Leontine Sagan, and Georg Pabst (chap. 2).
Wilfried van der Will pursues the reversal of modernism's emancipatory potential in the National Socialists' harnessing of technologies of mass communication (chap. 3). Axel Goodbody, Dennis Tate, and Ian Wallace refute a
simplistic equation of the German Democratic Republic with the NS-politics
of Gleichschaltung, or mass control through ideological uniformity, by charting criticism internal to that state. Two chapters are devoted to West German
history. Keith Bullivant and C. Jane Rice emphasize the founding of print
media institutions and the interplay of literature, film, and theory in creating
the oppositional movement of the 1960s (chap. 4). Then Rob Bums and Wilfried van der Will explain the state-subsidized cultural boom in theater, television, and education as a sign of the more varied and socially oriented class
stratification whicl1 West Germany's Marshall Plan-funded economy produced into the 1980s. Finally, Godfrey Carr and Georgina Paul chronicle in
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the former eastern states of the unified Germany another media explosion
which both opened up new vehicles for expression and squelched avenues of
critique through the financial logic of the Western, capitalist publishing industry.
The work of Burns and his authors is related to that of other scholars such
as Leslie Adelson, Russell Berman, and Rob Holub, who similarly interweave cultural, aesthetic, economic, and political phenomena, but more explicitly explore the interrelationship between the Frankfurt School and
Cultural Studies, or the Frankfurt School and Deconstruction, Marxism, or
Feminism. Holub takes up in Crossing Borders, Reception Theory, Poststructuralism, Deconstruction (1992) negotiations of Cultural Studies through the
transfer of theory between Europe and the United States. Berman analyzes
individual authors and events from Heinrich Heine to the Gulf War in Cultural Studies of Modern Germany (1993) while exploring the ramifications of
German and French theory as well as u.s. notions of the political and the
aesthetic. In framing culture with regards to gender and cultural/religious
identity, Adelson connects in Making Bodies, lviaking History: Feminism and
German Identity (1993) notions of body-centered experience in the works of
recent Frankfurt School-based thinkers like Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge
and the literary works of Anne Duden, TORKAN, and Jeanette Lander.
Achieving the broad historical sweep of Berman's book and reasoning as
Adelson does that Cultural Studies includes the history of underrepresented
groups such as women, the collection of authors in German Cultural Studies
has made substantial strides in realizing the goals set out in the 1970s by
scholars in the Birmingham Center in England and, in the U.s., in the German Studies Association and the Coalition of Women in German. Bums's
group integrates into their cultural history recognition of the barriers to
women's equal education at the pre-college levels and to their study at universities (chap. 1), their enfranchisement in 1919 and venturing into professions considered appropriate for men (chap. 2), the forms which their
cooperation with National Socialist ideology took (chap. 3), the writings of
Anna Seghers, Brigitte Reimann, Christa Wolf, and lrmtraud Morgner who
helped shape and criticize socialism in the German Democratic Republic
(chap. 4), the efforts of postwar women in the Federal Republic of Germany
to dear the rubble of bombed buildings, to survive rape by occupation soldiers, and to achieve the equivalent of an Equal Rights Amendment in the
1949 Basic Law (chap. 5), the groWtl1 of the West German women's movement as it was spurred on by the films of Helke Sander and Margarethe von
Trotta (d1ap. 6), and women's losses through the legal and economic changes
of unification (chap. 7).
The representation of marginalized groups other than women is not as
thorough. While the authors on the chapters concerning the post-1945 German states address the cultural history of Southern and Eastern Europeans
who came to West Germany as "guest workers" and extended their migrant
literary culture to reach into the literary culture of native-speakers of German, they do not acknowledge the Vietnamese and Mozambican workers in
the GDR, or the Afro-German citizens in the two Germanies. Furthermore,
this collective has recorded the discrimination against gays and lesbians in a
cryptic reference to the criminalization of male homosexuality in Paragraph
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175 from 1871 but not explained the persecution of gays in concentration
camps as part of the history of nationalism. The development of lesbian culture in the Weimar Republic and the different sites at which lesbians could
construct a legally sanctioned public sphere in East and West Germany is
also conspicuously absent.
Nonetheless, with its Frankfurt School base, Burns's anthology makes important strides in telling the stories of nation-building and modernism in
Germany from feminist and multicultural perspectives. A clear lay-out, a
manageable list of works for further reading, and an informative chronology
contribute to an easy read. An invaluable resource, especially after the postunification wave of German histories which barely covered gender politics,
German Cultural Studies clears the way for cultural histories of modern Germany which reflect more upon the country's diverse population in the years
to come.
Wayne State University
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